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Abstract:
Recent work has suggested that the discontent over perceived negative impacts arising
from liberalisation and globalisation need to be more carefully considered. The critiques
emanating from non-governmental organisations and social movements are considered to be
amongst the most significant. This paper examines one example of such criticism – localism –
that emerged during the economic crisis in Thailand. This example of localism is found to be an
example of populist reaction to the changes and inequalities generated by capitalist
industrialisation. The paper assesses this critique, its political strength and its potential to provide
an alternative economic model for Thailand. While providing a useful moral argument regarding
the impact of neoliberal globalisation, populist localism is unable to develop a sound alternative
model.
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1Globalisation arouses passionate debate. Th re are those who extol its virtues, arguing that
the imminent ‘borderless world’ is a pinnacle of progress. These ‘globalisers’ have been
keen to promote corporate capitalism and the advantages of liberalisation and the operation
of the market (as one well-known example, see Ohmae, 1990). Those not so enamoured by
this prospect portray globalisation as far more problematic and, like imperialism, a product
of Western desire to subject and exploit the developing world (see, for example,
Chossudovsky, 1998; Mahathir, 1999). But, as Higgott and Reich (1998: 1) have pointed out,
‘globalisation’ is a ‘most overused and under-specified’ term, and there is now considerable
academic debate regarding the nature of globalisation (see Higgott and Reich, 1998; Woods,
1998).
Much recent academic discussion appears to agree that ‘globalisation’ catches the essence of
a historical movement, a triumph of a neoliberal and characteristically Anglo-American
ideology, a more intense stage of capitalism, a confluence of events and technologies, or
some combination of these. It is agreed that there is something novel about the rapid
processes of change that is having significant impacts for business, government and, indeed,
ordinary people. The debate however produces competing perspectives regarding the nature
of these processes, how recent they really are, the impact they will have on the state, and
especially on the power of the nation-state (Gill, 1995; Evans, 1997; Hirst, 1997; Weiss,
1997).
This paper does not attempt to engage arguments concerning the nature and meaning of
globalisation. It accepts that, old, renewed or new, the processes and ideologies identified
2with globalisation have real impacts, both positive and negative. Rather, the paper examines
a specific example of discontent regarding the impact of globalisation, and attempts to assess
the strength of this critique. This challenge emerged from an attack on neoliberalism and
globalisation in Thailand following the devaluation of the baht in July 1997 and the resultant
recession. The approach to recovery supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and implemented by the Thai government demanded enhanced liberalisation. This resulted in
a massive restructuring of ownership and control of the economy and significant social costs.
The domestic reaction, especially that emanating from significant elements of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and social movements, was vigorous in its rejection of
liberalisation and globalisation, and proposed a rural localism as an alternative. Prior to the
consideration of this approach, a brief examination of the manner in which the impacts of
globalisation have been assessed in the literature will be presented.
Resistance to globalisation
Much of the triumphalism of the globalisers has concentrated on the benefits they identify as
flowing to investors, companies, producers and consumers (Woods, 1998: 6). Typically
these are claimed to be associated with the efficiencies said to derive from the unfettered
operation of the global market. Even where globalisers identify losers, they tend to see this
as temporary, believing that globalisation is will eventually bring rewards to the majority of
the population.
Not surprisingly, other commentators have placed greater emphasis on those identified as
potential and actual losers (Woods, 1998: 9). One group argues for greater efforts to
3integrate social safety nets or welfare within market-friendly policies and for wider
participation in policy-making, nationally and internationally (Hirst, 1997: 435).
Dependency and Marxist approaches have emphasised the inequalities seen as inherent in the
global expansion of capitalism. Strongly influenced by dependency perspectives, Walden
Bello and his colleagues, writing of Southeast Asia, have consistently argued that the
capitalism of the region, and the nature of globalisation, is flawed. They have insisted that
increased liberalisation results in misery for the majority, while enriching a minority and
benefiting business in rich countries (see, for example, Bello and Rosenfeld, 1992; Bello t.
al., 1998). While Marxists have debated the political ramifications of globalisation, they
have tended to view it as a further extension of the power of capital over labour. In this stage
of development the discipline of the capitalist market and the exploitation of capitalist
relations of production are seen to have extended to every corner of the globe (Gill, 1995:
406). However, the Marxist debate has been around their political response to globalisation
(see Tabb, 1997a, b; Wood, 1997; Herman and DuBoff, 1997). But such critiques have been
marginal to the mainstream globalisation discourse.
Following the Asian financial crisis, however, mainstream discussants have been giving
increased attention to globalisation’s opponents. Amongst the most vocal critics has been
Malaysia’s Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir Mohamad. He identifies globalisation as a
conspiracy of Western capitalists, international financial and regulatory institutions, Western
governments, and international NGOs to ‘… cause developing countries to become mere
production centres for the globe-girdling agents of the richer, ethnically European nations.
The current interpretation of globalisation is devised entirely in the West … to serve their
own good’ (Mahathir, 1999).
4While Dr Mahathir tends to the extreme and strident, as Higgott (1998) has demonstrated,
his views are reflective of a wider unease about the impact of globalisation on Asia. Higgott
and Phillips (1999) see the Asian crisis and consequent world economic instability as
resulting in considerable resentment of the role of international financial institutions, as
evidence of a crisis for the neoliberal orthodoxy that underpins globalisation. As they assess
it, ‘… we are experiencing the first serious challenges to the hegemony of neoliberalism as
the dominant form of economic organisation since the end of the Cold War’ (Higgott and
Phillips, 1999: 5).
These challenges are essentially reformist. For example, there are calls for a greater re-
regulation of finance capital and for a new architecture of such regulation. It is unlikely that
such restructuring will seriously challenge the ideological hold of what Gill (1995: 405) calls
‘oligopolistic neoliberalism’ however. Even Dr Mahathir seems to believe that there could
be an acceptable face to globalisation, if developing countries only had the opportunity to
decide their approach rather than having globalisation foisted upon them (Mahathir, 1999).
More fundamental objections to globalisation and alternatives to the neoliberal approach are
identified by Devetak and Higgott (1999: 485) as being associated with NGOs and social
movements. These emphasise justice in the international system and within individual
nation-states. While Dr Mahathir sees NGOs and similar groups as part of the Western
conspiracy, he mistakenly conflates criticisms of his government’s human rights and
environmental record with the attacks of finance capital and the strictures of international
financial organisations.
5In fact, most NGOs are anything but lackeys of Western neoliberal ideology. Indeed, Dr
Mahathir’s approach to capital controls has been loudly applauded by some NGOs.1 Higgott
(1999: 30) is correct to observe that international NGOs are
‘… at the core of the alternative approach, exhibit behaviour which is
normative, prescriptive, increasingly internationalised and highly politicised.
They attempt to change the organising assumptions of the contemporary
global order and thus alter the policy outcomes.’
He considers the concerns of such groups genuine, and not necessarily driven by
protectionist ideology or narrow interests. In this context Higgott is referring specifically to
international NGOs. However, at the country level, national and local NGOs and social
movements are also significant participants in this process of resistance to neoliberal
globalisation.
One of the lessons from the academic debate is that the national state retains significant
power even in a globalising world (Evans, 1997; Hirst, 1997). If this is accepted, then the
role of national NGOs and social movements must also be significant in shaping any
alternative discourse. There has been limited critical analysis of the policy and role of NGOs
in particular sectors (see, for example, Green and Mathias, 1995). However, there have been
few discussions of the kinds of alternative discourses developed by various national groups
and movements in response to the issues of equity and justice raised by the impact of
globalisation.
                                                          
1 As an example of this support by NGOs that have been in dispute with Dr Mahathir in the
past, see Khor (1998), and other articles of the Third World Network at
http://www.twnside.org.sg/souths/twn/crisis.htm
6Following a brief background to the economic crisis in Thailand, the remainder of this paper
will critically examine localism as an example of the discontent over the perceived
deleterious impact of neoliberal economic strategies, and the globalisation that is identified
as their inherent outcome.
Thailand’s economic recession
Until the economic crisis erupted in July 1997 Thailand’s economy had experienced almost
four decades of uninterrupted growth. The period from 1987 to 1997 was one of
unprecedented economic boom, with Thailand achieving some of the highest growth rates in
the world, and real increases in per capita GDP. These growth rates were indicators of the
industrial transformation of the society. Thailand attracted enormous foreign investment,
especially from East Asia, and the economy grew rapidly (Jansen, 1997). The boom saw
confidence brim, employment opportunities grow, absolute poverty decline, although wealth
inequalities increased, and fabulously wealthy magnates and business empires created.
The results of the transformation were spectacular. In 1960 agriculture accounted for about
40 percent of GDP, most exports, and employed more than 80 percent of the population. By
1997 just 48 percent worked in agriculture, some 35 percent of GDP was attributable to
manufacturing, and industrial growth saw manufactured exports expand from one percent of
total exports in 1960 to 80 percent by the mid-1990s (Economic Section, 1998: 9; Mingsarn,
1998: 3-4).
This transformation coincided with a political reformation. Until the 1980s, Thailand’s
system of government was usually authoritarian. The country had experienced long periods
7of military rule since 1932, and while there had often been space for political opposition, this
was routinely narrowed by the military and the civil bureaucracy. However, during the 1980s
and 1990s, while these conservative and authoritarian forces remained strong, there was a
transformation to a system where the constitution appears more significant, elected civilian
politicians rule, and civil society has flowered. Indeed, the media and various NGOs have
played significant roles in challenging each of these governments, pointing to corruption and
abuses of power (see Hewison ed., 1997).
But the boom did not last, and after early warning signs were ignored, and devaluation
resisted, the bust was spectacular and the recession deep. The details of the financial and
economic crisis have been discussed elsewhere (see Hewison, 1999: 28-34), so there is no
need to elaborate here. In any case, it is the response to the impact of the resulting recession
that has been of most significance for the emergence of localism.
The contraction of the economy that followed the baht devaluation was spectacular.
Bangkok Bank (1999) figures show economic contractions of 1.3 percent in 1997 and over
nine percent in 1998. Whole business empires collapsed, bankruptcies doubled as thousands
of companies closed in 1998, and hundreds more followed in 1999. Investment fell
significantly, especially in the property, construction and manufacturing sectors, and the
resulting unemployment exceeded two million, the highest ever recorded. This had a
significant impact in rural areas due to the strong links between rural incomes and urban
employment. Rural remittances from urban workers have been substantially reduced or have
ceased. The poor saw incomes reduced by up to 25 percent while the cost of living rose by as
much as 40 percent (Na ion, 26 September 1998, 22 March 1999). In education, the crisis
8saw dropout rates increase. More than 45,000 students dropped out in 1997, a record, with
69 percent at the primary level (BP, 18 February 1999).
The downturn has thus had a major impact on ordinary Thais. The social consequences have
been significant, with many of the income and other gains of the period of economic boom
having been rolled back. A massive restructuring of Thailand’s business class is also
underway, and has seen a large part of the domestic capitalist class struggling to retain its
businesses. Foreign capital has made large gains, buying up joint venture partners and
increasing investments in a range of sectors (see Hewison, 1999: 31-3). National pride has
been seriously damaged.
The initial IMF-organised response to the crisis was highly focussed on economic and fiscal
targeting. While more attention was given to social safety nets as the recession deepened, the
strict controls demanded by the IMF were a further challenge to nationalist sentiment. It was
in this atmosphere that discontent with further liberalisation became significant. Many
identified Thailand’s economic problems as emanating from the economic boom, when
liberalisation meant Thailand’s further economic integration with world production, trade
and finance. In short, while the boom had seen some champion globalisation as a panacea for
Thailand’s problems (see Chai-Anan, 1997), it was now seen as problematic.
9Responding to globalisation in Thailand
Following a brief period when the government led by Chavalit Yongchaiyudh demonstrated
its inability to respond to the crisis, a new coalition, led by Chuan Leekpai took office in late
1997. At that time, Thailand announced its ‘full commitment’ to the IMF’s economic
programme. It has generally accepted the IMF diagnosis of the problems, and its emphasis
on the need to restore investor confidence through (initially) tight monetary policy, increased
financial liberalisation, greater economic openness and foreign investment, and the reform of
public and private governance. In short, it accepted a neoliberal response to the crisis.
Keeping the IMF and Western governments on side has meant reforms that demonstrating
that Thailand has learnt its ‘lessons’. Despite some debate with the IMF, the Chuan
government’s efforts at recovery and further liberalisation have been supported by Western
governments, foreign investors and the major international financial institutions.
However, the reaction in Thailand has not been entirely supportive. Big domestic business
was, for a time, critical of the IMF programme for its negative impact on liquidity, but its
relationship with the Chuan government has been solid. Small and medium business has
been less sanguine, reflecting the differential impact of the crisis and the measures for
ameliorating its impact.
But there has also been vocal opposition to the government’s responses, and especially to the
role of the IMF and World Bank. Initially, this emerged as a nationalist reaction to the
realisation that large parts of the economy were likely to end up in foreign hands. It was also
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recognised that thousands of other companies would collapse under the burden of debt and
interest rates. The impact on employment was also a concern.
The nationalist response was a desire to ‘save’ the country and its businesses from foreign
control. It involved NGOs and some business leaders criticising IMF policies and opposing
liberalisation, Buddhist monks collecting gold and dollars for the nation, workers opposing
privatisation, and a rush of anti-IMF publications. For a time it looked like this movement
was gaining strength, forcing the government to provide limited and lukewarm support,
including assigning a Deputy Prime Minister to oversee a Committee for Thai Helps Thai.
While a few of these activities continue, their intensity has waned. However, an NGO and
social movement-based opposition has remained active, and has been most coherent in
developing and sustaining an alternative discourse.
This discourse has not only reacted against the capitalist triumphalism of the boom and the
response by the IMF and the Chuan government to the crisis, but has drawn attention to
perceived weaknesses in the country’s social and political make-up emanating from the very
nature of its development. Pasuk (1999: 1) has characterised this as a ‘localism discourse’. It
asserts the significance of the rural community as an opposition to economic growth, urban
and industrialism.
This approach builds on several earlier debates regarding NGO development strategy and
ideology, much of it related to the cultural perspective perspective (CDP) on village
development of the 1980s (see Chatthip 1991; Rigg, 1991; Hewison, 1993). The
contemporary discussion – characterised here as localism – is more diverse than the earlier
NGO debate, and gained particular poignancy from the impact of the crisis. It is
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characterised by its interest in the following issues, each to be examined below: self-
sufficiency; self-reliance; the rejection of consumerism and industrialism; culture and
community; power; rural primacy; and nationalism.2
The re-emergence of the debate on localism gained considerable momentum from the Thai
King’s 1997 birthday speech, where he suggested a return to a self-sufficient economy
(Bhumibol, 1998).3 The new localism discourse, like the CDP before it, advocates rural self-
sufficiency in basic needs – food, health care, housing and clothing. An important element
in this was the view that production for family and community consumption meant that
farmers would not be so reliant on the market. Hence, the damage caused by the vagaries of
domestic or international markets was reduced. In this perspective, self-sufficiency denotes
a ‘moral economy’ (Bangkok Post, hereafter BP,4 2 February 1998; Sangsit, 1998a: 42). The
notion of self-sufficiency is applied not just to the individual and family, but to the nation as
a whole. The suggestion is that a self-sufficient nation does not need the outside world, and
may choose its links rather than be forced into international markets and trade.
Self-sufficiency builds self-reliance, for it constructs strong communities with the
confidence to resist external pressures. Self-reliance is the ability of a community to take
control of its destiny by making informed decisions about the future (Seri, 1989: 4-5). This
                                                          
2 In the discussion of the concepts involved, the sources utilised will also include materials
produced prior to the economic crisis, but which reflect the localism discourse.
3 The King’s observations drew on his ‘new theory’ of self-sufficient and contented
agriculture, meant to help people make a living at subsistence level, bringing new direction
and hope to their lives (Chai Pattana Foundation, 1995, 1997). While he pointed to
agriculture, arguing the importance of ‘having enough to eat … enough to get by on’, he also
applied this to factories, where self-sufficiency was seen to involve lower wages and benefits
for workers during the crisis (Bhumiphol, 1998: 4, 7).
4 References to the Bangkok Post are to stories reporting the views of people involved in the
localism debate.
12
approach can apply to individuals as much as communities, with Prawase5 (1999) rguing
that self-reliance is being able to stand on one’s own feet, and sustainable development
deriving from one’s own initiative. This perspective can include an anti-development
position, suggesting that farmers de-link from the market economy and return to subsistence
(Prawase in Chatthip 1991: 124). The idea of de-linking is based on the assumption that it is
debt that prevents farmers from overcoming poverty (Thaworn, 1987). The answer to this is
to cut the rural community’s ties to the ‘mainstream economy’ (BP, 24 Ma  1999).
Localists often define self-reliance in Buddhist terms. For example, Prawase (1999) suggests
that the greed inherent in modern development has led to chaos, and that solutions need to be
grounded in Buddhist teaching. He thus gives particular attention to elements he identifies as
the bedrock of Thai culture and values – Buddhism and agriculture (Kitahara, 1996: 92-3).
A strong message in localism is that liberalisation and market economics has failed.
Evidence for this is found in the economic crisis and recession (Sangsit, 1998a: 33). The
market, consumerism, materialism, urbanism and industrialism are seen as the inter-
connected outcomes of rampant capitalist development, injurious to rural communities.
‘Modern agriculture’ is identified as having destroyed the assumed abundance of the past.
Production for the market and export, the introduction of cash crops, land clearing, and the
use of Western concepts in farming are seen as responsible for ‘food shortage, low
production, financial loss and indebtedness’ (Ruang, 1996: 24-5). The attraction for these
Western methods is driven by consumerism. The identified rural malaise and the economic
                                                          
5 Dr Prawase Wasi is a respected medical doctor, rationalist Buddhist, author, commentator,
campaigner for human rights, and has long-established links to NGOs. In addition, he has
often been asked to advise and work with government, most recently and importantly in
developing the 1997 constitution. For comments on this latter role, see McCargo (1998: 11-
27).
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crisis derive from the rural population’s false and created need for consumer goods (Set
Sayam, 1997: 52). This perspective includes a deep suspicion or rejection of development
approaches seen to promote industrialism and urbanism (Sanitsuda, 1998).
The antidote to the ‘lust for consumption’ is the self-reliant economy. Once established, its
proponents argue, peace and happiness will emerge in rural communities, and the problems
of ‘migrant labour, … crime, narcotics and gambling … [will] become less severe’ (Sangsit,
1998a: 45). For many, this involves the end of the market, for where there is no cash
economy there can be no greed and no debt (Kitahara, 1996: 93).
The localism discourse is not entirely comfortable with urban life. It emphasises values
derived from the rural community, its culture and religion, and the need to reinvigorate,
rediscover or create community values. Rural society is seen to have been ‘full of generosity,
compassion, and mutual assistance, which are all disappearing…’ especially in the urban
situation (Rewadee, 1996: 22). ‘Community’ is a term imbued with particular values:
solidarity, equality, ruralism, popular wisdom, environmental concern, and the like. It is
money, trade, the market and commerce that have brought the deterioration of these values,
and there is a call for their rediscovery.
For localists the community is not simply a source of empowerment for really existing
villagers. Rather, the community is an ethical construction. The community and its values
become a means of resistance to globalisation and for reasserting values identified as
appropriate. Indeed, this ethical or moral community is identified as the rootstock for a new,
self-reliant, self-sufficient society (Pasuk, 1999: 6-7, citing Saneh Chammarik, a respected
activist academic).
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The localist analysis of power emphasises rural-urban dichotomies. Urban culture, identified
with capitalist industrialism and consumerism, is seen as responsible for the destruction of
the rural community and devastating local cultures (see Thai Dev lopment Newsletter, 34,
1997: 49). In this, industry is a ‘curse’, having ‘disintegrated communities, broken family
ties, and destroyed the very root of the rural society’ (BP, 24 May 1998). Much is made of
the fact that capitalists and powerful political elites have squeezed the village economy.
Farmers must work hard just to survive, and labour has been pushed into the city, to the
detriment of the village (Chang Noi, 1997: 44; Chatthip, 1991: 131). Further, industry is seen
to have provided few benefits for the agricultural sector as industrialists and urban classes
have grown wealthy while the peasantry has been left in poverty (Sangsit, 1998b: 52).
This exploitation of the rural sector derives, in part, from the neglect of agriculture in the
state’s development strategies, resulting in a fundamental ignorance of the potential
economic significance of the countryside (Saneh in Pasuk, 1999: 9). Hence the localists call
for a return to basics through an increased emphasis on agriculture. For some, agriculture
and small, community businesses are considered the only economic sectors that are ‘real’;
certainly, finance and big business are seen as ‘fake’ (Prawase in Pasuk, 1999: 13).
While the CDP included nationalist elements, localism, coming to prominence during the
economic recession, includes a far more vocal nationalism. In part, this is a corollary of its
localism, but it also draws strength from its public opposition to the liberalising reforms
demanded by the IMF and World Bank, and implemented by the Chuan government.
There is a strong view that Thais have been misled and made slaves of financially strong
countries (see Pasuk, 1999: 5). This slavery includes the desire to consume all that emanates
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from the West (Thai Development Newsletter, 34, 1997: 49). Director of the Project for
Ecological Recovery Srisuwan Kuankachorn (1998) argues that the model of rapid, large-
scale development dependent on foreign capital is wrong. It was foisted on Thailand by the
US, which, through aid and education, brainwashed the elite and technocrats to implement
an American development model. This approach encouraged resource destruction, brought
no benefits to the majority, and entrenched consumerism. The IMF and World Bank now
reinforce this model, which threatens ‘Thailand as  culture’ (Pasuk, 1999: 12).
In this context, globalisation is perceived as a particular threat for it is seen to emphasise
money and capital ‘at the expense of the nation and nationalism’ (Sangsit, 1998a: 34).
Globalisation used as shorthand for Westernisation and its negative associated outcomes for
Thailand. For example, well-known rationalist Buddhist and human right campaigner Sulak
Sivaraksa often uses ‘globalisation’, ‘consumerism’and ‘Westernisation’ interchangeably,
with the latter identified as a new colonialism (Nation, 21 March 1999). This is seen to
threaten Thai values, so there is a call to protect Thai culture, and especially the agricultural
sector. Liberalisation is firmly opposed, with the government accused of selling out the
country to foreigners, at the behest of the IMF (BP, 8 and 14 March 1999).
Assessing localism as resistance to globalisation
If NGO and social movement resistance to globalisation is to be taken seriously, then it
should offer a realistic interpretation of the threats and negative impacts of globalisation, and
should be capable of providing a feasible alternative to globalisation. Such an alternative will
need to be robust in both its political and economic analysis.
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In the 1980s there was considerable debate regarding the efficacy of the CDP. Much of this
revolved around its appropriateness as an approach to village development. For example,
Rigg (1991) criticised the CDP for being alien, unrealistic, privileging an elite,
misconceiving the cultural picture of the village, and for being populist and backward
looking. While Rigg was taken to task for misrepresenting the CDP (Hewison, 1993), the
nature of the new localism suggests a need to revisit some of his criticisms. To begin
attention will be given to the populism of the localism discourse.
Populism has been a major theme of development theory and practice (Kitching, 1982). It is
also a notoriously imprecise term (Canovan, 1981: Ch. 1). However, drawing on a range of
assessments, populism’s defining elements can be identified. These are: (i) tradition is
revered and organic models of society are preferred; (ii) it is conservative, with change
deriving from the inner growth of existing community institutions and practices; (iii) the past
is seen as a ‘golden era’, with the pristine, idyllic village and its traditions having been
diluted; (iv) agricultural development is given priority; (v) if industrialisation is proposed,
then labour intensity is emphasised; (vi) justice, equity, and equality are emphasised; and
(vii) outsiders are seen as exploiters, and urban exploiters are responsible for removing the
surplus from rural areas. From these characteristics it is clear that Thailand’s localism
discourse is populist.
In a recent paper sympathetic to the localisers, one of Thailand’s leading political
economists, Pasuk Phongpaichit (1999: 13-4) notes that, in addition to challenging its
assumptions, logical inconsistencies and conservatism, there have been three major
criticisms of localism. First, viewing the community as a source of morals and values is a
‘hopeless idealisation’. If there ever was such a moral community, it has been irreversibly
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transformed. Second, rural community values, rather than being based in egalitarianism and
co-operation, derive from the patronage system. It is patronage that has permitted the
political and economic exploitation of the rural community. Third, the salvation of the rural
community is not to be sought through a reactivation of local wisdom but through a more
thoroughgoing transformation of the community and countryside. These are important
criticisms. As might be expected, however, the localists do not accept them. They do not
exhaust the criticisms that can be made of this renewed populism. Here we can outline seven
of these.
The first relates to the ‘anti-capitalist’ nature of the populist arguments. A number of critics
misconceive the capitalist society that they oppose. For example, Pasuk (1999: 15) argues
that the localism discourse has gained currency because ‘of the social division and
environmental damage which are features of the development of urban capitalism all through
history and all around the world’. Capitalism is seen here as an imposition on, and ex er al
to, rural areas. This is not the trajectory of a capitalist system that has a relatively short
history and is only now becoming universal. This position also suggests that any analysis of
exploitation must be based on a rural-urban dichotomy. Implicit in this is a privileging of a
particular kind of work – agricultural production. As an editorial in the Bangkok Post (23
June 1998) observed, the ‘farmer may be the backbone of the nation but is no more
important than the truck driver, the computer programmer, the doctor and the business
executive’. This anti-urban bias can and does preclude political alliances across the supposed
rural-urban split. It is especially dismissive of the potential of a political role for organised
labour. As Ungpakorn (1999) has indicated, to ignore labour is to misunderstand its
significance in the Thai political economy.
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Second, it is useful to remember that the intellectual notion of ‘community’ is a product of
modernity, created as a reaction to modernity. ‘Community’ and ‘modernity’ are thus
constructed as opposites, with ‘community’ defined in functionalist terms, where the organic
whole is composed of essentially inseparable parts (Kitahara, 1996: 77-8). This reinforces
the conservatism of localism. It also suggests that it is essentially grounded in a romantic
construction of an imagined past. Such reactions to neoliberal globalisation are not
suggestive of dynamic alternative visions of social or economic organisation.
A third point is to note that while discussions of community are a mixture of empirical
description and normative positions (Kitahara, 1996: 16), localism is essentially normative.
In response to empirical criticisms, localists have argued that their position on community is
not a description of any reality, but an ethical proposition (Pasuk, 1999: 15-6). However, this
defence cannot be used for its critique of modernity. It is remarkable that, in their opposition
to industrialism, many urban-based intellectuals ignore positive aspects of industrialisation.
It has yet to be demonstrated that such advances are possible without industrialisation and
accompanying urbanisation (Kitching, 1982: 2-3).
A fourth issue for populist localism is in the broad area of representation. In his critique of
the CDP, Rigg (1991: 204) argued that it was externally constructed and elitist. He suggested
that ‘selective notions of village self-reliance, cooperation and participation have been
coopted by academics (and then by the state) and placed within an entirely new, alien
framework.’ While the CDP maintained strong village roots, this is not clear for the new
discourse. The impact of intellectuals on the localist discourse has been significant, with the
economic crisis prompting many intellectuals to take up the localism cause. The problem is
that they tend to alienate it from its roots in village-level development practice, re-
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establishing it in a context where it offers little that is different from past forms of populist
rhetoric. As an intellectual discourse, removed from its grassroots, it is likely to promote
backward-looking strategies.
The fifth problem relates to the involvement of state officials. When they take up localism,
especially when the King’s ideas are included, notions of self-reliance and self-sufficiency
are effectively hijacked into an official state development discourse. This sustains Rigg’s
criticism that localism is an alien framework masquerading as village-based, and little
different from orthodox development strategies. For example, the Ministry of Interior (1997:
15-30) has managed to manipulate self-sufficiency into a top-down strategy. And, academics
who support the Ministry produce development blueprints that reproduce state paternalism
(Mongkol, 1997).6 In other words, the co-opting of the discourse by the state, while seen as a
victory by some localists, is more likely to herald the decline of the strategy.
Sixth, the relationship between populism and nationalism should be considered. The Thai
case is interesting, as nationalism has been identified with the authoritarianism of monarchs
and the military. Remarkably localists appear to have developed a discourse that now
includes all elements of the right-wing nationalism of ‘Nation, Religion and Monarchy’.
According to Pasuk (1999: 1) a groundswell of support for self-reliance grew from the
King’s birthday speech. Moreover, the emphasis on community has seen Buddhism linked to
village culture.7 Buddhism’s perceived association with local culture, has seen the populist
localism imbued with considerable Buddhist chauvinism. While such nationalism might be
                                                          
6 It should be noted that there is considerable opposition to the perceived opportunism of the
Ministry of Interior in its adoption of self-reliance (Pasuk, 1999: 14-15).
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understandable in the context of the economic crisis and the IMF’s unpopular remedies, it is
not simply an outcome of the crisis. For example, Chatthip (1991: 133) argues that the
‘community culture discourse’ is ‘unique to Thailand’. Here he wants to nationalise a
populist discourse that has been a common historical reaction to the inequalities brought by
capitalist industrialisation in many historical settings.
Nationalist rhetoric can be utilised by a range of causes, and some politicians have been keen
to adopt localism and its nationalism (BP, 12 March 1999). Thitinan (1998) contends that
‘… it was not surprising that the very same individuals and coalitions who earlier pushed for
financial liberalisation were now trying to erect nationalist fences to shut out foreigners,’ and
notices that many of those who oppose liberalisation are those who created Thailand’s
economic problems. Thitinan warns that ‘… NGOs and pro-democracy groups … should not
allow their hardship and disenchantment to be manipulated and co-opted…’. He adds that
this is naïve politics, for the real ‘enemies’ in the economic crash were not outsiders.
Finally, it is important to examine the economic potential of populist localism. It is
obviously critical that this be established if the approach is to be considered as a viable
alternative to capitalist production and neoliberal globalisation. The economic model at the
heart of populist localism does not necessarily reject notions of material progress. Rather, it
sees this as deriving from agriculture based on the smallholder farm and the community of
smallholders. There is no place for large-scale industrialisation or urbanisation, and rural
society and culture can be maintained and recreated.
                                                                                                                                                                                  
7 In fact the CDP had roots in Catholic development thought (Chatthip, 1991: 126-33).
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In his analysis of similar approaches, Kitching argues that there is no example to support the
thesis that living standards can be raised and inequality reduced while maintaining the rural
family household as the basic production unit. Further, it seems that there may be a limit to
the levels of welfare that can derive from agricultural production (Kitching, 1982: 136, 180).
While there are arguments against this, the localist’s tendency to see the market and trade as
only exploitative demands that agriculture be small-scale.
Populist localism provides a vision of equality and freedom from the ecological
destructiveness and human exploitation of global capitalism. But it presents few insights as
to how this vision could be implemented through localist development strategy. As Kitching
(1982: 180) argues, an ‘attractive utopian vision is not an adequate basis for a theory of
development, nor does the desirability of a state of affairs guarantee its possibility.’
Conclusion
Populist localism offers is a moral critique of capitalist industrialisation, liberalisation and
globalisation. It has a powerful appeal because it challenges neoliberalist development
dogma. The recognition that the rural sector has been ignored or exploited is a salient
corrective to capitalist triumphalism. As Pasuk (1999: 16) notes, during the crisis, populist
criticisms have seen some state and society ‘initiatives to moderate free-market liberalism’,
and the localism discourse has been a ‘source of hope’ for some. This may be true, and it
may be sufficient in itself. However, if Thailand’s localism is to provide an alternative to the
globalisers neoliberal vision, then it needs to go further than this, disentangling itself from
the populist rethoric of the past.
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But there is no politically sound nor a viable economic alternative proffered by the localists.
Thailand’s new populism has not wrenched itself free of the issues that have bedevilled
populist politics everywhere: it is reactionary, romantic, is anti-urban, and encourages
chauvinism. In any case, where populist ideology has been converted into national
development practice, the outcomes have been poor (see Kitching, 1982: Ch. 5). While it can
be agreed that there are gross social and economic injustices involved in Thailand’s
development, the localist alternative appears no more viable than previous forays into
populist theory and practice.
To reject populism is not to condemn the poor to the worst excesses of globalisation and
capitalist exploitation. The point is to note that populist ideas are a frequently seen response
to industrial development and the expansion of capitalist methods of production, and that
populist alternatives have been found wanting, politically and economically.8
To date there have been few attempts to appraise the alternatives to neoliberal globalisation
offered by NGOs and social movements. That the dominant neoliberal perspective on
globalisation needs to be challenged for its neglect of equity and other negative outcomes is
clear. That NGOs and social movements should have a significant role in this challenge is
not in doubt. While this paper has addressed only one challenge from these groups, it does
suggest that not all will be realistic. It indicates that some will fall back on utopian visions,
repackaging old ideas to face the significant challenges posed by capitalist globalisation.
                                                          
8 The argument here is with populist localism as a national development strategy; is not to
argue that the CDP, as a village-based rural development strategy, has no merit – for its
strengths see Hewison (1993). There is a risk, however, that an approach, once firmly rooted
in development praxis, is transformed into a middle-class intellectual exercise when it
becomes a political discourse.
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While offering succour for some, such approaches represent a limited political strategy and
risk diminishing the impact of NGO and social movement critiques of globalisation.
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